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Food and Water Watch v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60191 (D.
Mass. Aug. 6, 2008).
Stephanie Showalter, J.D., M.S.E.L.
Imagine a world in which fishermen ring dinner
bells to catch fish instead of towing nets. Sound
like science fiction? It’s not as farfetched as one
might think. In an intriguing twist on Pavlov’s
experiments with his dogs, researchers at the
Marine Biological Laboratory (MBL) at Woods
Hole Oceanographic Institution are currently
studying whether black sea bass can be acousti-
cally conditioned to return to the net when
called. If successful, this project has the poten-
tial to revolutionize the way we think about
aquaculture. 
Could fish be raised similar to free-range
chickens, roaming freely while feeding natural-
ly in the wild? Free-range aquaculture, in theo-
ry, could produce healthier animals, since ani-
mals raised in confinement are at a higher risk
of disease and stress, and reduce the environ-
mental impact by minimizing pollution. It
could also reduce the costs of aquaculture since
operators would not need to buy as much feed or
closely monitor dozens of nets. There are a num-
ber of disadvantages to free-range aquaculture,
of course, including a very good chance that nat-
ural predators will eat the farmed fish while
they are living in the wild. But, all ranching
comes with risks. Foxes eat chickens, coyotes eat
sheep, and wolves eat calves. As long as enough
livestock comes back to make the business prof-
itable, maybe it is worth the risk. That is, if the
released fish are not negatively impacting wild
populations.
Most of these questions are a bit premature
considering researchers do not even know if fish
are amenable to training. A $270,000 grant from
the National Oceanographic and Atmo-
spheric Administration through its National
Marine Aquaculture Initiative has enabled
researchers to prove that black sea bass will
respond to sound. Last summer, researchers
placed 6,500 black sea bass in a circular tank.
The fish were fed by dropping food into an
enclosed area within the tank that the fish could
enter only through a small opening. Three times
a day for two weeks a tone was sounded for
twenty seconds before food was dropped into the
enclosure. At the end of the two-week period,
according to one graduate student, “you hit that
button, and they go into that area, and they wait
patiently.”1
So black sea bass will respond to sound, but
can they remember? By feeding without the tone
for a few days and then testing the fish’s
response to the tone, the team at MBL observed
that some fish seemed to remember to report to
the feeding area at the sound of the tone for as
long as ten days.2 The project was off to a
promising start and researchers were ready to
launch field experiments in May 2008. 
MBL planned to release 5,000 black sea bass
raised from local broodstock into an Aquadome,
a half-dome structure 32 feet in diameter and 16
feet tall covered with wire mesh, attached to the
seafloor in Buzzards Bay, Massachusetts.3 After
Aquaculture Project Survives Motion
for Preliminary Injunction
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the released fish are acclimatized to their new
environment and reminded of their training,
portions of the mesh will be removed to allow
the fish to roam. Researchers will then sound
the tone, which has a range of about 100 meters,
after a few days and after several weeks and
record how many fish come back. The
Aquadome would be in the water for a total of
six months.
Legal Challenge 
Because the Aquadome could obstruct naviga-
tion, the MBL had to apply for a § 10 (Rivers
and Harbors Act) permit from the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers (Corps). On May 30, the
Corps issued a permit for the project after con-
cluding in its Environmental Assessment (EA)
that there would be only minor negative
impacts on water quality near the project site.4
MBL placed the Aquadome and released the
fish in June. In early July, Food and Water
Watch (FWW), a national environmental
advocacy organization, filed suit against the
Corps alleging violations of the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and seeking
to halt the project until a full environmental
review is conducted.
Preliminary Injunctions
A party seeking a preliminary injunction has
the burden of proving that (1) they are likely to
succeed on the merits of the case at trial; (2)
they will suffer irreparable harm if the activity
is not halted; (3) the balance of harms weighs in
their favor, and (4) granting the injunction will
serve the public interest. A party unable to
demonstrate either likelihood of success on the
merits or irreparable harm “must fail in his
quest for preliminary injunctive relief.”5
FWW claimed that the Corps violated
NEPA by issuing the permit without preparing
an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).
NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare an
EIS for “major federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment.”6 An agency may first prepare an En-
vironmental Assessment (EA) to determine
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whether the action will have a significant
impact. If the agency determines the action will
not have a significant impact on the environ-
ment, it may issue a “finding of no significant
impact” (FONSI) and proceed without prepar-
ing an EIS. 
Adequacy of the EA
Courts review federal agencies’ EAs and
FONSIs under a four-part analysis. Agencies
must identify relevant environmental concerns
and take a “hard look” at those concerns.7 An
agency who decides to issue a FONSI after tak-
ing a “hard look” must “be able to make a con-
vincing case for its finding.”8 Finally, if the
action will have a significant impact, an agency
can avoid preparing an EIS “only if the agency
finds that changes or safeguards in the project
sufficiently reduce the impact to a minimum.”9
FWW raised four environmental impacts
during the public comment period which it
claims the Corps failed to adequately address in
its EA: the potential impact of the project on
Essential Fish Habitat (EFH) and juvenile fish
near the project site and the potential harm to
the genetic health and natural behaviors of wild
populations. Although the Corps identified
each of these concerns in its EA, FWW claimed
that the Corps failed to take a “hard look” at
these issues primarily because some of the
Corps’ responses to the FWW comments were
copied verbatim from MBL’s responses to the
public comments.
The district court disagreed. “The fact that
the Corps sought and relied upon MBL’s com-
ments [was] not, in itself, troubling” to the
court.10 The Corps solicited input from the MBL
researchers and state and federal agencies
regarding the project’s potential impact. The
Massachusetts Department of Marine Fisheries
had “no recommendations” for the Corps.11 The
National Marine Fisheries Service stated, “it
does not appear that this project is likely to have
more than a minimal and temporary impact on
Essential Fish Habitat and that any associated
adverse impacts have been minimized through
project design.”12 The court found MBL’s analy-
sis of the public comments and its explanation
as to why the project would have a minimal
impact to be compelling, especially in light of
the management agencies’ agreement. The
Corps, therefore, took the requisite hard look at
the issues.
Significance of Impact
FWW challenged the Corps’ conclusion that the
project would not have a significant impact.
When evaluating the significance of actions,
Federal agencies are required to consider,
among other things, the “unique characteristics
of the geographic area such as proximity to . . .
ecologically critical area,” and the degree to
which the effects are likely to be “highly contro-
versial” or “highly uncertain.”13 FWW claims
the Corps must prepare an EIS because this pro-
ject implicates all three of these considerations.
The district court again disagreed. The pro-
ject is expected to temporarily impact 80
square feet of EFH consisting primarily of sub-
tidal sand. Except for the first three weeks of
the project when the fish are confined to the
Aquadome, wastes will be dispersed over a
large area as the fish swim freely. Despite the
project’s proximity to an “ecologically critical
area” (the EFH), the temporary impacts “did
not warrant a finding of NEPA significance.”14
Furthermore, the court found “little evidence”
that the project is highly controversial.
Although a few agencies and individuals
expressed concerns during the comment peri-
od, FWW “seems to be a lone voice in its objec-
tions to the adequacy of the EA and FONSI.”15
Nor are the project’s impacts “highly uncer-
tain.” Because of the Corps’ experience permit-
ting large salmon farms in New England, the
court accepted the agency’s conclusion that
“the impacts of the proposed project are not
uncertain, they are readily understood based on
past experiences the Corps has had with simi-
lar projects.”16
Irreparable Harm
The district court concluded that FWW was
unlikely to succeed on the merits of its NEPA
See Aquadome, page 4
claim because the Corps’ EA and FONSI were
adequate. The court further found that, even if
FWW could establish a likelihood of success, it
would be unable to prove irreparable harm. The
court stated that FWW “lacks any affidavits
from scientists or experts proving that the
Project presents a real threat of irreparable
harm to the environment.”17 FWW failed to pre-
sent any evidence that significant numbers of
juvenile fish live in the project area or that
native fish would become dependent on the food
released at the site. Additionally, FWW relied
exclusively on scientific studies on the environ-
mental impacts of large-scale aquaculture, not
small-scale temporary research projects.
Conclusion
Ultimately the court determined that the scales
tipped in the Corps’ favor. Granting an injunc-
tion in this case would place a significant bur-
den on MBL. By the time the court heard the
case, the fish were already in the water. If the
project were to be stopped, quite a bit of time
and money would have been wasted. Fur-
thermore, the Court concluded that it was in the
public interest to deny the injunction. This pro-
ject had received taxpayer money through a fed-
eral grant program and the findings of the
researchers could lead to improvements in both
aquaculture and stock enhancement programs.
For instance, acoustic condition-
ing could be used to wean
hatchery fish from food pellets
to natural food sources after
release thereby increasing their
chances of survival.18
While the court refused to
halt the project, the court case
has not ended. The parties are
proceeding towards a trial on
the merits, although the case
could be dismissed on other
pre-trial motions, such as a
motion for summary judg-
ment. The MBL project has
proceeded as well. The re-
searchers recently opened por-
tions of the Aquadome to allow the fish to swim
in and out.19 The project is due to wrap up in
late October before the native black sea bass
migrate south for the winter.
Endnotes
1. Jay Lindsay, Scientists Train Fish to “Catch”
Themselves, USA TODAY, March 26, 2008.
2.   Id.
3.   Public Notice, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
New England District, Feb. 26, 2008.
4.  Food and Water Watch v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60191 at *5 (D.
Mass. Aug. 6, 2008).
5.  Id. at *10.
6.  42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
7.  Food and Water Watch, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
60191 at *14-15.
8.  Id. at *15.
9.  Id.
10. Id. at *17.
11. Id. at *18-19.
12. Id. at *19.
13. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b).
14. Food and Water Watch, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
60191 at *22-23.
15. Id. at *24-25.
16. Id. at *26.
17. Id. at *34.
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Cohler v. United States, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
48158 (D.V.I. June 24, 2008). 
Terra Bowling, J.D.
The United States District Court for the
District of the Virgin Islands recently rejected
the emotional distress claims of five family
members who watched a wave strike and injure
a relative.
Background 
While vacationing on a cruise ship, Norman
Cohler and his family took a day trip to Trunk
Bay Beach in the Virgin Islands National Park.
At the beach, Cohler was struck and injured by
shore-breaking waves. Cohler and his relatives
who had accompanied him to the beach filed a
negligence action against the U.S. government
and the tour operator, Paradise Aqua Tours.
Cohler sought damages for his injuries, claim-
ing the government had a duty to exercise rea-
sonable care to protect him from the dangerous
conditions at Trunk Bay and that Paradise Aqua
Tours had a duty to warn him and his family.
Cohler’s relatives sought damages for the severe
emotional distress they claim resulted from wit-
nessing the accident. 
Emotional Distress
To prevail on a claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress based on witnessing an
injury to a third person, a plaintiff must show
that s/he 1) was in the “zone of danger” when
the accident occurred; 2) suffered bodily harm
as a result of emotional disturbance; and, 3) is
a member of the injured third party’s immedi-
ate family. 
To be within the “zone of danger” for the
purposes of an emotional distress claim, the
plaintiff must either “sustain a physical impact
as a result of defendant’s negligent conduct, or
[be] placed in immediate risk of physical
harm.”1 Because three of the family members
were not in the ocean when Cohler was injured,
the court found that they could not have sus-
tained a physical impact from the waves or been
in immediate risk of harm. They were therefore
not within the “zone of danger.” 
As for the remaining two family members
who were within the “zone of danger” because
they were in the water, they failed to demon-
strate that they suffered physical harm as a
result of the accident. Physical harm can
“encompass bodily injury brought about solely
by the internal operation of emotional distress,”
but there must be evidence of bodily harm
beyond that associated with fright or shock.2
While the court recognized that the family
members within the zone of danger did suffer
from shock, mental anguish and depression, the
court found that these injuries were emotional,
not physical, and therefore non-compensable.
According to the court, neither relative present-
ed sufficient evidence of any physical symp-
toms or manifestations of bodily harm.
Conclusion
The court determined that there were no mate-
rial facts in dispute with respect to the plain-
tiffs’ claims of emotional distress and granted
the government’s motion for summary judg-
ment. Cohler’s claims against the defendants
for his injuries will move forward.
Endnotes
1. Cohler v. United States, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
48158 at *4 (D.V.I. June 24, 2008).
2.  Id. at *11.
Court Dismisses Family Members’
Claims of Emotional Distress
Photograph of cruise ships courtesy of ©Nova Development Corp.
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605
(2008).
Terra Bowling, J.D.
Nearly 20 years ago, the Exxon Valdez grounded
in Prince William Sound, spilling over 11 mil-
lion gallons of oil along the Alaska coastline.
The spill resulted in the deaths of hundreds of
thousands of birds, marine mammals, and
marine life. Researchers estimate that as many
of 26,000 gallons of oil remain embedded in the
shoreline and in nearby rivers and streams.
Despite this, in a victory for Exxon, the U.S.
Supreme Court reduced the $2.5 billion puni-
tive damage award against the company for the
oil spill to about $500 million. 
Background
In 1993, commercial fishermen and other plain-
tiffs brought a class action suit against Exxon.
The U.S. District Court for the District of
Alaska originally entered a punitive damage
award of $5 billion. The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals remanded the case twice on the issue of
punitive damages. The District Court’s award
was ultimately reduced to $2.5 million, using
formulas derived from previous rulings of the
Supreme Court on punitive damages. 
Exxon appealed its case all the way to the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court framed the
case around three questions: (1) whether there is
corporate liability for punitive damages as the
result of an employee’s acts; (2) whether the
Clean Water Act preempts state punitive dam-
age awards, and (3) whether the $2.5 billion
punitive damage award is excessive. 
Vicarious Liability 
There is a split in the circuits about whether a
corporation is responsible for the reckless acts of
employees acting in the scope of their employ-
ment. The Ninth Circuit’s position is that there
is corporate liability in punitive damages for
reckless acts of managerial employees. Because
the captain of the Exxon Valdez acted recklessly
by piloting the vessel while intoxicated, the
Ninth Circuit found Exxon liable for the puni-
tive damages that resulted from that act. Other
circuit courts, however, have held that there is
no vicarious liability in such a situation.
The Supreme Court split evenly on the
issue, 4 – 4.1 Because the court was evenly divid-
ed, it could not overturn the Ninth Circuit’s
decision. As a result, the Ninth Circuit’s rul-
ing on this issue stands and the split in the cir-
cuit remains. 
Preemption of Punitive Damages
Next, the Court looked at whether the Clean
Water Act (CWA) preempted punitive damage
awards in maritime pollution cases. The Court
found that it did not, noting that we “find it
hard to conclude that a statute expressly geared
to protecting ‘water,’ ‘shorelines,’ and ‘natural
resources’ was intended to eliminate sub silentio
oil companies’ common law duties to refrain
from injuring the bodies and livelihoods of pri-
vate individuals.”2 There was no clear indica-
tion that Congress intended to completely occu-
py the field of pollution remedies through the
CWA. Furthermore, the Court found that puni-
tive damages would not “have any frustrating
effect on the CWA remedial scheme.”3 State
common law remedies are therefore still avail-
able to injured parties.
Is $2.5 Billion Excessive?
Finally, Exxon challenged the size of the $2.5
billion punitive damage award. The Court ruled
(5-3) that the award, which was five times the
amount of compensatory damages, was exces-
sive. Justice Souter, writing for the majority,
stated that “the real problem, it seems, is the
Page 6                                                                             Volume 7, No. 3 The SandBar
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stark unpredictability of punitive awards” and
“outliers” (extremely high awards). As a solu-
tion to that problem, the court created an easy-
to-use ratio. The Court’s review of state statutes
revealed that a slim majority of states use a 3:1
ratio of compensatory to punitive damages, and
some even allow multipliers as high as 5:1.
Interestingly, “the court accorded greater
reliance on the results of its literature [search]
than its statutory review to establish a reason-
able limit on punitive damages in the maritime
setting.”4 The court relied on a number of stud-
ies of trends in punitive damage awards in tra-
ditional tort and contract cases to conclude that
the median ratio of punitive to compensatory
awards is less than 1:1. Citing the need to pro-
tect against “unpredictable and unnecessary
awards,” the Court concluded that “a 1:1 ratio,
which is above the median award, is a fair upper
limit in such maritime cases.”5 In the case of
Exxon Valdez, a 1:1 ratio results in a punitive
damage award of $507.5 million (the amount
equal to the compensatory damage award).
It is unknown at this time whether the
court’s 1:1 ratio will remain limited in applica-
tion to maritime cases. Corporations and their
lawyers most certainly will argue that the
Court’s opinion is applicable to the calculation
of punitive damages in land-based tort and con-
tract actions. At the very least, the Court’s deci-
sion is a strong signal that large punitive dam-
ages awards will be under intense scrutiny in
the future.
Final Settlement
In late August, Exxon agreed to release approxi-
mately $383 million for distribution to the
approximately 33,000 remaining plaintiffs, pri-
marily commercial fishermen.6 The parties con-
tinue to fight over the remaining $70 million and
whether Exxon owes $488 million in interest.
Endnotes
1. Only eight justices participated in this case
because Justice Alito owns Exxon stock.
2. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2619
(2008).
3.  Id.
4. Lewis Goldshore and Marsha Wolf, The Mother of
All Oil Spills: U.S. Supreme Court Clarifies Punitive
Damages, N.J. LAW. JOURNAL (Aug. 18, 2008).
5. Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2633.
6. Wesley Loy and Tom Kizzia, Exxon Settlement
could be Distributed in October, ANCHORAGE DAILY
NEWS (Aug. 27, 2008).
Photograph of clean-up efforts after the Exxon Valdez oil spill courtesy of NOAA.
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Anchor Point Condominium Owner’s Association v.
Fish Tale Properties, 2008 WL 2609706 (Wis. Ct.
App. July 3, 2008).
Berkos v. Shipwreck Bay Condominium Associ-
ation, 2008 WL 2761313 (Wisc. Ct. App. July 17,
2008).
Stephanie Showalter, J.D., M.S.E.L.
Wisconsin state law prohibits a riparian owner
from conveying any riparian right, except for
the right to access the water by crossing over the
upland.1 This prohibition is quite unique. In the
vast majority of states, riparian rights can be
severed from the land and transferred freely. In
July, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals issued two
opinions which dramatically expand the scope
of the prohibition.
Riparian Rights
Owners of waterfront property have some spe-
cial rights that owners of landlocked property
do not have. These rights are referred to as
riparian, when the property abuts rivers, and lit-
toral, when it abuts lakes and oceans. In
Wisconsin courts often use the terms inter-
changeably. In Wisconsin, riparian rights
include “the right to use the shoreline and have
access to the waters, the right to reasonable use
of the waters for domestic, agricultural and
recreational purposes, and the right to construct
a pier or similar structure in aid of navigation.”2
In 1994, the Wisconsin Legislature passed a
law restricting the ability of riparian owners to
transfer these rights to others. Section 30.133(1)
of the Wisconsin Statutes states: 
no owner of riparian land that abuts a
navigable water may convey, by ease-
ment or by a similar conveyance, any
riparian right in the land to another per-
son, except for the right to cross the land
in order to have access to the navigable
water. This right to cross the land may
not include the right to place any struc-
ture or material in the navigable water.
Section 30.133(1) was the Legislature’s
response to the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s
holding in Stoesser v. Shore Drive Partnership.3
The issue in Stoesser was whether riparian own-
ers could convey riparian rights to non-riparian
landowners through an easement. Homeowners
in a subdivision with no riparian property
sought to enjoin Shore Drive Partnership, the
owner of a lakefront bar and restaurant, from
placing a pier or other structure in the water
which would interfere with the homeowners’
rights to use the lakeshore. The homeowners
claimed riparian rights through an easement in
a 1939 deed which reserved for the owners in
the subdivision the right “to the use of the
channel as a means of ingress and egress” and
“to use the lake shore for bathing, boating, or
kindred purposes.”4 The Court concluded that
the easement was valid to carry out the parties’
intent that the owners in the subdivision have
access to the lake via Shore Drive’s property
because “Wisconsin follows the general rule
that riparian rights can be conveyed to non-
riparian owners by easement.”5 Shore Drive
could not interfere with those rights. The
Legislature obviously disagreed with the
court’s conclusion and enacted § 30.133 which
“seems designed primarily to prohibit the con-
struction of piers by nonriparians.”6
Right to Use Boat Slips
On July 3, 2008, the Court of Appeals issued its
opinion in Anchor Point Condominium Owner’s
Association v. Fish Tale Properties. The Asso-
ciation had filed suit to prevent guests of Fish
Tale’s restaurant from using the Association’s
private piers and boat slips. Some of Fish Tale’s
Transfer of Riparian Rights
Under Scrutiny in Wisconsin
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customers use the pier to moor their boats to
gain access to the land and the restaurant. The
question before the court was whether docu-
ments purporting to establish the right of a non-
riparian to use piers and boat slips were invalid
transfers of riparian rights under § 30.133(1).
The properties in question were two adja-
cent lots, one of which abutted Lake Wisconsin.
The restaurant is located on the non-riparian
lot. When the riparian lot was sold to develop
condos, documents were executed creating an
easement for shared driveways and parking lots
between the two properties and granting the
restaurant property the right to use some of the
condos’ piers, boat slips, and docks. The
Association claimed these documents were in-
valid because they transfer riparian rights to
non-riparian owners. 
Fish Tale argued that the right to use piers
and boat slips is not a riparian right. The Court
of Appeals disagreed, holding that the use of
pier and boat slip space is a riparian right.
“Both pier use and pier placement are riparian
rights, arising from a riparian owner’s owning
land abutting navigable water.”7 The court’s rea-
soning adheres to the following logic: if the law
grants you the exclusive right to place a pier,
you also have the exclusive right to use that pier.
Because the court conclud-
ed that the right to use a
pier or boat slip is a riparian
right, the Association could
not transfer that right to
Fish Tale.
In the alternative, Fish
Tale contended that even if
the right to use piers is a
riparian right, a riparian
owner may transfer that right
pursuant to the exception in
§ 30.133(1), which allows
transfers to provide access to
the water. The court dis-
agreed, stating that the
“plain language of the statute
states that a riparian owner’s
transferable rights are limit-
ed to the right to cross the land in order to have
access to the water.”8 Fish Tale wants to use the
piers to gain access to private land, not to cross
private land to gain access to the water. According
to the court, that is a riparian right that cannot be
transferred separately from the land.
Reservation of Riparian Rights
In Berkos v. Shipwreck Bay Condominium Associ-
ation, a developer of a condominium complex
attempted to reserve his riparian rights when he
relinquished ownership of common areas,
which included the lake shoreline, to the condo
association. When the condominium owners
refused to permit the developer to construct a
marina along the shoreline, the developer sued
asserting he was the owner of the riparian rights
of the waters in front of the complex. The Court
of Appeals voided this transfer as well. 
The court based its conclusion on the simi-
larity of the facts of this case to those in Stoesser
– a non-riparian owner reserved riparian rights
through an easement. Because the Legislature
passed § 30.133 to overturn the court’s decision
in Stoesser, allowing a reservation here would
run counter to legislative intent. Acknow-
ledging that § 30.133 does not explicitly refer to
See Riparian, page 15
Photograph of marina boats in slips courtesy of ©Nova Development Corp.
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Richard McLaughlin, Harte Research Institute for
Gulf of Mexico Studies, Texas A&M University
Corpus Christi
Wyndylyn Von Zharen, Texas Institute of
Oceanography, Texas A&M University Galveston
Background
The shoreline of the Gulf of Mexico (GoM)
stretches 3,540 miles making it the ninth largest
body of water in the world.1 About twenty mil-
lion people live in the U.S. coastal counties that
border the Gulf. Many of these counties are
among the fastest growing in the nation. A num-
ber of key sectors of the U.S. economy such as
offshore energy, vessel construction, fishing,
marine transportation, and tourism are concen-
trated in the GoM.
Large portions of the Gulf have been seri-
ously impacted by a combination of natural and
anthropogenic stresses. These pressures have
caused a variety of environmental and econom-
ic threats including degraded water quality, loss
of critical habitat, introduction of invasive
species, depleted fish stocks, increased coastal
erosion, greater vulnerability to coastal hazards,
and other problems.
Traditionally, coastal and ocean areas have
been managed and governed at specific, isolated
levels with little cooperation or collaboration
across local, state, tribal, federal, or internation-
al boundaries. Coordinated management of
policies or laws to minimize cumulative impacts
has been rarely undertaken. Fragmented laws,
overlapping and unclear jurisdictions, policies
that are not adaptive and responsive to change,
and limited communication among coastal and
marine law, policy, and manager practitioners
are common in the GoM region.
Because of these limitations, coupled with
the complexity of new and competing uses of a
finite resource and increased understanding of
the interrelatedness of the various systems
within the GoM ecosystem and in part due to
exponentially increasing complexity as multiple
Ecosystem-based
Management in
the Gulf of
Mexico:
Opportunities 
and Challenges
3-D model of the Gulf of Mexico courtesy of NOAA’s Ocean Explorer.
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factors are considered, this traditional approach
has been rejected in favor of ecosystem-based
management (EBM) which considers the cumu-
lative impacts on the entire ecosystem. 
To be successful, an EBM strategy requires
cross-jurisdictional, interdisciplinary manage-
ment goals as well as adaptive, collaborative gov-
ernance mechanisms. Equally critical to the
strategy is a strong cooperative management
component,2 one that enables a sharing of deci-
sion-making power, responsibility, and risk
among governments and other stakeholders
including but not limited to, resources users,
environmental interests, experts, and wealth
generators. Cooperative management is a form
of power-sharing. Cooperative management ini-
tiatives begin with the identification of the
issues and recognition of a need to make
changes. This strategy fosters joint accountabili-
ty, thus decreasing the likelihood of a stakehold-
er acting solely in her or his own vested interests
and basing decisions exclusively on short-term
goals for single issues. The EBM strategy must
also be adaptive. Adaptive stewardship is essen-
tial because of the complexity of the Gulf of
Mexico and the continual development of
knowledge about its inhabitants and resources.
Recent efforts by the Pew Oceans Com-
mission,3 U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy,4
and the Bush Administration’s U.S. Ocean
Action Plan5 attempt to provide a foundation to
advance a more effective EBM approach to
coastal and ocean policy. Although these impor-
tant efforts have generated momentum for
changing policies, it is not yet clear how the
EBM and other reforms will evolve.
It was within this context that 37 experts par-
ticipated in a workshop, entitled Managing for a
Healthy Gulf of Mexico Ecosystem: Obstacles,
Opportunities, and Tools, held November 1-2, 2007
in Corpus Christi, Texas. The workshop was a
collaborative effort between the Co-principal
Investigators and the Environmental Law
Institute with funding from the National Sea
Grant Law Center and the David and Lucile
Packard Foundation.6 The following summarizes
the most important findings of this workshop.
Obstacles and Challenges to EBM in the GoM 
Workshop participants stressed that developing
and employing EBM principles will be an essen-
tial step towards resolving the multitude of chal-
lenges facing the GoM. However, significant
obstacles must be overcome. These obstacles are
unique to the GoM and include a lack of agree-
ment on a common set of objectives among stake-
holders. Despite the difficulty, there needs to be
greater effort in facilitating a consensus on a
clearly defined set of outcomes. With consensus
will come a commitment for change from voters
and the development of political leadership.
Important decisions will have to be made in
the absence of complete ecosystem information.
Ecosystems are dynamic biophysical systems in
which organisms interact with each other and
the physical environment in complex ways.
Marine ecosystems may shift suddenly and
much remains unpredictable and uncertain in
how they operate. Moreover, many of these
processes occur at multiple scales from micro-
scopic events to large interacting populations
and from geographically small areas to large-
scale regional systems. The difficulty in fully
understanding the complexity of these events
must not become an insurmountable barrier to
making management decisions.
EBM in the GoM would move forward more
quickly if there was a serious regional problem
that could serve as a common denominator to
bring people together. Many participants sug-
gested that the threat from hurricanes may rep-
resent such an organizing principle, but do not
believe that this has actually occurred in prac-
tice. The threat posed by toxic algal blooms in
the GoM was also suggested as the type of
regional problem that may someday become a
unifying issue.
The GoM is a large and heavily-used body of
water that is important to a significant and
diverse number of stakeholders. Many of these
stakeholders such as the energy industry, recre-
ational fishermen, ports and maritime shipping
interests, real estate developers, and the tourism
industry have tremendous influence over policy
decisions in the region. In addition, the five
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states that border the GoM have traditionally
defended “states rights” and their political
autonomy from federal mandates. In light of
this political tradition, federally mandated
EBM initiatives or even regionally devised
approaches may be resisted. The breadth and
divergent interests of these stakeholders and
state governments make the GoM a difficult
area to achieve consensus. There will be little
chance of success for EBM initiatives without
input and buy-in from these and other stake-
holders in the region.
After EBM plans are developed, sufficient
funding needs to be provided for proper imple-
mentation and enforcement. Expansion in gov-
ernment regulatory and administrative activi-
ties or compensation for private property im-
pacts is not possible without additional funding
sources. Innovative partnerships between the
public and private sectors should be explored to
develop new sources of revenue to move EBM
forward in the region.
Finally, if EBM is to be properly implement-
ed, there must be some resolution to the reluc-
tance of permit holders, stakeholders, and gov-
ernment agencies to fully embrace adaptive
management principles. Institutions and indi-
viduals rely on the finality of permitting and
other administrative decisions to execute pro-
jects and make informed investment decisions.
Adaptive management does not provide that
finality, but instead advocates change in direc-
tion when new information is discovered. Other
institutional pressures including fear of poten-
tial litigation, commitment to decisions already
made, and bureaucratic biases are serious obsta-
cles that must be overcome for adaptive man-
agement and EBM to be successful.
Opportunities to Improve EBM in the GoM
EBM in the GoM would be improved by creat-
ing innovative visualization tools that will pro-
vide an easily accessible information source for
integrating law, policy, human dimensions, and
science, and identifying small groups and
NGOs with which to partner. These groups are
often drivers for change. Partnering with the
National Estuary Programs, for example, is
important as they may be best suited as test
beds and because they are at the right scale. The
Gulf of Mexico Alliance also has the potential to
assist with these efforts because it builds upon
existing programs and resources and adds tasks
that lead to small incremental changes. The
Alliance has strong federal political support
that should not be underestimated.
Benefits may also be achieved by looking at
the environment from an ecosystem services
perspective as a way to put a value on those ser-
vices to gain public and legislative support.
Providing policymakers with empirical data on
the full value of ecosystem services is essential
for them to make informed and persuasive
political decisions. It also allows uninformed
stakeholders to understand that the natural
ecosystem of the GoM has hidden monetary and
non-monetary values that need to be protected
and conserved thereby providing a useful
framework for outreach and education efforts.
Stakeholder involvement must be inclusive
and transparent. The general public and inter-
ested stakeholders should be involved as early
as possible. Active participation in the planning
and implementation of EBM initiatives is essen-
tial to the long-range success of any program.
Providing full information and an opportunity
for input will avoid the problems of opposition
by stakeholders who either misunderstand
potential impacts or feel that their concerns
have not been considered.
Monitoring and enforcement measures must
be well defined and fully funded. This should
include a robust program capable of tracking
scientific baselines to demonstrate success
through environmental indicators. Incentives
should be provided for citizen-based monitor-
ing and involvement.
Any problem being addressed through EBM
should be examined comprehensively and effec-
tively bound in size and time. Using a “large
marine ecosystem” model may or may not be an
appropriate geographical scale depending on
the specific problem being addressed. The focus
should be on matching appropriate size or scale
to achieve goals given existing institutional and
jurisdictional constraints. Furthermore, tempo-
ral scales should be matched to avoid slow gov-
ernance changes lagging behind quick ecosys-
tem degradation or quick governance changes
overtaking slow ecosystem processes.
Implementation plans should drill down on
key issues with firm time constraints. This
includes provisions for specific action items to
be undertaken within a specific period of time
at a specific cost.
Indicator species or issues should be used,
when possible, to capture the public’s imagina-
tion and serve as both an issue upon which to
build support and to indicate basic health of the
GoM over time. Potential examples include:
• Marine protected areas such as the
Flower Garden Banks Marine San-
ctuary or the “Islands in the Stream”
initiative to develop a network of GoM
marine protected areas in the U.S. and
Mexico;
• Specific charismatic species such as
sperm whales, tarpon, bluefin tuna,
billfish, whale sharks, manta rays, or
sea turtles; and
• Regional problems such as threats
from catastrophic weather events,
harmful algal blooms, or sea-level rise.
Stakeholders should have a role in identifying
and developing these indicators. If possible,
indicators should be chosen that are already
being monitored to build upon existing data
and programs. Moreover, existing baseline data
should be used as an indication of success or
failure and managers must be willing to adapt
based upon ongoing evaluation criteria. 
Conclusion 
There is a strong consensus that for EBM to be
successful in improving the health and steward-
ship of the GoM, a strong and vibrant coopera-
tive management regime is required, one in
which stakeholders agree on a list of specific
objectives and have a willingness to achieve
c o o p e r a t i v e
m a n a g e m e n t
goals. This, of
course, is no
easy task and
will require a
l o n g - t e r m
c o m m i t m e n t
to improving
our understand-
ing of scientific
baseline information as well as developing bet-
ter policies and strategies within the region. If
this can be achieved, rather than a potential
arena for competition and strife due to the ever
increasing complexity of issues, the GoM may
someday serve as a model of effective cooperative
management and collaborative governance.
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U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy (2004) available
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Hawaii Superferry Litigation
Continues
Wong v. Bush, 2008 WL 4093619 (9th Cir. Sept.
5, 2008).
Stephanie Showalter, J.D., M.S.E.L.
Hawaii Superferry is an inter-island ferry ser-
vice currently offering twice-daily trips between
Honolulu, Oahu and Kahului, Maui. The
Alakai, the company’s first ferry, can accommo-
date 836 passengers and up to 230 subcompact
cars.1 Controversy erupted immediately after
the commencement of the service. Environ-
mentalists worry about the ferry’s impact on
humpback whales and its potential to transport
invasive species. Residents of Maui and Kauai
voice concern that the ferry’s arrival will boost
tourism and development on islands already
under immense development pressure. 
In the latest round of litigation over the
Hawaii Superferry, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the district court’s denial of
injunctive relief to protestors challenging the
Coast Guard’s establishment of a security zone
in Nawiliwili Harbor. Wong v. Bush is rooted in
the February 2005 decision of the Hawaii
Department of Transportation (HDOT) to
exempt harbor improvements at Kahului, Maui
to accommodate the Superferry from the Hawaii
Environmental Policy Act (HEPA). On August
23, 2007, the Hawaii Supreme Court ruled that
the HDOT may not exempt the improvements
to the Kahului Harbor.2
Despite the Supreme Court’s order, Hawaii
Superferry began service from Kauai on August
26, 2007. An injunction had not yet been issued
by the lower court. That day, hundreds of pro-
testors cheered as over thirty surfers and swim-
mers formed a human blockade to prevent the
Superferry from leaving Nawiliwili Harbor.3
The Coast Guard had to forcibly move the pro-
testors out of the way. The Coast Guard soon
announced that it was establishing security
zones to “provide a safe and secure environment
for both recreational vessels and the Alakai.”4
Photograph of the
Hawaii Superferry pro-
vided courtesy of  Sean
Gardinier.
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the reservation of riparian rights, the court read
§ 30.133(1) as prohibiting “the severing by ease-
ment or by a similar conveyance of riparian
rights from the riparian lands to which they are
attached.”9
Conclusion
Daniel Berkos is expected to appeal his case to
the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Berkos main-
tains that “he didn’t convey anything” and will
most likely ask the Court to review the mean-
ing of § 30.133.10 The decision in Anchor Point
may also be appealed. Fish Tale’s attorney has
criticized the Court of Appeals decision say-
ing, “Why should it matter to Wisconsin
whose boat is in a pier?”11 The Wisconsin
Supreme Court had better put its thinking cap
on right now.
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v. Fish Tale Properties, 2008 WL 2609706 at
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Association, 2008 WL 2761313 at *15 (Wis. Ct.
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L. J. (July 28, 2008).
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Megan Wong and her fellow protestors chal-
lenged the Coast Guard’s authority to establish
the security zones. The protestors claimed the
zone violated their First Amendment rights, the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and
the Coast Guard’s authority to establish such
zones. The Ninth Circuit upheld the district
court’s denial of injunctive relief. The court
found that the Coast Guard did not infringe on
the protesters’ First Amendment right of free
speech because the security zone is a reasonable
time, place, and manner restriction. The court
also found no violation of NEPA or the agency’s
authority under 50 U.S.C. § 191(b) to establish
security zones to safeguard vessels, harbors,
ports, and waterfront facilities.
While the Coast Guard won this round, the
Superferry’s woes continue. In October 2007, in
a separate lawfuit, the circuit court enjoined
operations until the environmental assessment
is complete. While the Hawaii Legislature later
passed a law allowing operations to continue,
the Sierra Club has a challenge to that law
pending with the Hawaii Supreme Court.5 The
company continues to operate its ferry service
between Oahu and Maui, but has halted service
to Kauai indefinitely.
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hawaiisuperferry.com/images/pdfs/HSF-Fact-
Sheet-Final.pdf .
2.  Sierra Club v. Department of Transp., 167 P.3d 292
(Hawai‘i 2007).
3.  Jan TenBruggencate and Rick Daysog,
Surfers Block Hawaii Superferry, USA TODAY
(Aug. 27, 2007).
4.  Press Release, Coast Guard to Enforce Hawaii
Superferry Security Zones, Aug. 26, 2007.
5.  Associated Press, Court Appeal Could Halt
Ferry Service Again, KPUA Hawaii News,
http://www.kpua.net/news.php?id=15679 .
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AES Sparrows Point LNG v. Smith, 527 F.3d 120
(4th Cir. 2008). 
Terra Bowling, J.D.
In a closely watched case in the Chesapeake Bay,
the Fourth Circuit recently clarified the role of
states  with respect to the siting of liquefied nat-
ural gas (LNG) terminals. While some unan-
swered questions remain, the court did finally
answer one important question: does the Natural
Gas Act (NGA) completely preempt state regula-
tion of LNG terminals? 
Background
AES Sparrows Point LNG and Mid-Atlantic
Express (collectively, AES) proposes to construct
and operate a LNG import and re-gasification
facility to receive, store, and convert LNG for res-
idential, commercial, and industrial uses in the
mid-atlantic Region. The proposed location is
Sparrows Point, a heavily industrialized coastal
area in Baltimore County, Maryland.
AES encountered strong public opposition to
the construction of the terminal from the outset.
Spurred by the public outcry, in 2006 Baltimore
County adopted Bill 71-06 amending the county’s
zoning regulations to prevent the construction of
an LNG terminal at Sparrows Point. The new
zoning regulations stated that an LNG terminal
could only be constructed with a “special excep-
tion” and must be located at least five miles from
residential zones and 500 feet from businesses. 
AES challenged Bill 71-06, arguing that the
bill was preempted by the NGA. The NGA grants
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) “exclusive authority to approve or deny
an application for the siting, construction, expan-
sion, or operation of an LNG terminal.”1 The
NGA, however, contains a “savings clause” pro-
viding that the NGA does not affect the rights of
states under the Coastal Zone Management Act
(CZMA).2 The CZMA authorizes states to create
coastal management plans (CMPs) setting forth
the state’s “objectives, policies, and standards to
guide public and private uses of lands and waters
in the coastal zone.”3 Under the CZMA, states
with approved CMPs have the authority to review
federally permitted projects for consistency with
those plans and conditionally veto projects which
it finds inconsistent.4 The U.S. District Court for
the District of Maryland found that Bill 71-06 was
preempted by the NGA’s exclusive grant of
authority to FERC and enjoined the county from
enforcing the zoning ordinance.5
The county did not give up. In 2007, the
county responded by passing Bill 9-07 and
amending the zoning ordinance to list LNG ter-
minals among the prohibited uses in the
Chesapeake Bay Critical Area (CBCA).6 Because
Sparrow’s Point is located within the CBCA, Bill
9-07 would effectively prevent the construction of
the LNG facility.
AES again filed suit, alleging that Bill 9-07
was preempted by the NGA. The county coun-
tered by arguing that the bill had been incorpo-
rated into the state’s critical area laws and was
therefore part of Maryland’s CMP and saved
from preemption. The Maryland Critical Area
Commission had amended the county’s
Chesapeake and Atlantic Coastal Bays Critical
Area Protection Program (CAPP) to include Bill
9–07’s restriction on LNG terminal siting in
coastal areas. The CAPP is one of the state laws
identified in Maryland’s CMP. This time around,
the District Court granted summary judgment in
favor of the county concluding “that Bill 9–07
represented an exercise of Maryland’s ‘delegated
authority’ under the CZMA and was thus saved
from preemption.”7
Fourth Circuit’s Decision
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit disagreed. First,
with respect to the NGA, the court stated that
LNG Terminal in Baltimore
Receives Federal Approval
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“unless a state law prohibiting the siting of LNG
terminals is exempted from § 717b(e)(1)’s pre-
emptive effect by some other provision of federal
law, it is unenforceable.”8 The Fourth Circuit
held that the NGA savings clause does protect
state laws that are part of a state’s federally
approved CMP, but “the County has no authori-
ty under the CZMA to enact a ban on LNG ter-
minals unless, at a minimum, that ban is enacted
pursuant to the procedures established by the
CZMA.”9 Under the CZMA, an amendment to a
CMP becomes effective only after the amend-
ment has been approved by the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). 
The district court concluded that the bill did
not constitute an amendment to the state’s CMP,
but only “the implementation of it at the local
level.”10 The Fourth Circuit disagreed. The
CZMA defines amendments as “substantial
changes in” the uses subject to management; spe-
cial management areas; boundaries; authorities
and organization; or coordination, public
involvement and the national interest.11 The
court held that a complete ban on terminals in
the CBCA, not previously part of the state’s CMP,
constituted a substantial change in the uses sub-
ject to management. Because the county never
presented its amendment to NOAA for approval,
it is not part of Maryland’s CMP. The Fourth
Circuit stated that “mere adoption of Bill 9-07
into the County’s CAPP . . . is not sufficient to
make Bill 9-07 part of Maryland’s CMP.”12
Conclusion
The Fourth Circuit issued its decision on May
18, 2008. Although Maryland subsequently
determined that the project was not consistent
with its CMP, the Department of Commerce
overrode the state’s objection on June 26,
2008.13 The Department concluded that the nat-
ural interest served by the facility in helping to
meet regional energy demands outweighed
the project’s adverse coastal effects14 and that
the impact of dredging on fish and aquatic vege-
tation would not be significant.15 FERC may now
proceed with normal permitting and licensing
procedures for the AES terminal.
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15. Id.
Composite arial of Sparrows Point LNG site courtesy of the U.S. Coast Guard.
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Coast Guard Must Consider Impact
of Shipping Routes on Right Whales
Defenders of Wildlife v. Gutierrez, 532 F.3d 913 (D.C.
Cir. 2008).
Terra Bowling, J.D. 
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has
ruled that the U.S. Coast Guard is required to
consider the impact that the designation of ship
routing schemes may have on the endangered
North Atlantic right whales. 
Background
The North Atlantic right whale is one of the most
critically endangered species in the world. The
45-55 foot whales were historically heavily hunt-
ed. They became known as “right” whales be-
cause they “were considered the ‘right’ (correct)
whale to hunt due to their close proximity to
coastlines, their relatively slow speed, the prized
oils they contain, and the large volume of blubber
that gives them a tendency to float when dead.”1
Today, only an estimated 300 remain in the world.
The species is listed as endangered under the fed-
eral Endangered Species Act (ESA). Although
hunting has ceased, recovery has been hampered
by the species’ low birthrate and a high mortality
rate caused primarily by ship strikes and entan-
glements in fishing gear. 
The right whales spend the spring, summer,
and fall in New England waters and migrate to the
warmer coastal waters along the southeastern U.S.
for the winter. Pursuant to its responsibilities under
the ESA, the National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS) has designated the Great South Channel
east of Cape Cod, Cape Cod and Massachusetts
Bays, and waters off the coasts of southern Georgia
and northern Florida as right whale critical habitat.
Unfortunately, some portions of the whales’ critical
habitat experience dense shipping traffic. 
Litigation
On May 19, 2005, Defenders of Wildlife and several
other environmental organizations (Defenders) sub-
mitted a petition to NMFS “requesting emergency
regulations [that] require all ships entering and
leaving all major East Coast ports to travel at
speeds of 12 knots or less within 25 nautical miles
of port entrances during expected right whale high
use periods.”2 Simultaneously, Defenders notified
the Coast Guard that it intended to sue the agency
for failing to consult with NMFS about the impact
its regulation of commercial shipping has on the
right whale. NMFS denied the petition six months
later. The Coast Guard did not respond.
Defenders filed suit against the federal agencies
in November 2005. Defenders claimed NMFS’
denial of the emergency rulemaking petition was
arbitrary and violated the Administrative Procedures
Act and the ESA. Defenders claimed that the Coast
Guard was failing to insure that vessel traffic is not
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the
right whale and its habitat as mandated by the ESA.
The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the federal agencies. Defenders appealed.
Emergency Rulemaking Petition
Defenders argued that NMFS’ denial of the rule-
making petition was arbitrary “in light of the
admitted need for ship speed regulations and the
agency’s ESA section 7(a)(1) duty to protect right
whales through its programming.”3 Noting that it
would only overturn an agency decision not to
institute rulemaking in “the rarest and most com-
pelling of circumstances,”4 the D.C. Circuit upheld
the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
The court found that this case presented no
abnormal circumstances that would justify over-
turning the agency’s decision. NMFS denied the
petition on the grounds that a rulemaking on ship
strikes was already underway. The agency had
issued an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rule-
making (ANPR) in 2004 and was preparing a draft
environmental impact statement. At the time, the
agency believed this was the best means to imple-
ment an effective comprehensive strategy for
reducing ship strikes. The court deferred to
NMFS’ reasoning that an emergency rulemaking
would draw resources and staff time away from
the final rule. It makes no difference that, despite
the issuance of a proposed ship strike rule in June
2006, NMFS has yet to issue a final rule. The court
is “bound on review to the record that was before
the agency at the time it made its decision.”5
Traffic Separation Schemes
Congress, through the Ports and Waterways Safety
Act, requires the Coast Guard to “designate neces-
sary fairways and traffic separation schemes” to
provide safe routes for boats traveling in and out
of U.S. ports and waters.6 When establishing TSSs,
the Coast Guard must “take into account all rele-
vant factors concerning . . . protection of the
marine environment, . . . including but not limit-
ed to . . . environmental factors.”7 In addition, the
Coast Guard must comply with other relevant fed-
eral laws such as the ESA and the Marine
Mammal Protection Act. For example, § 7(a)(2) of
the ESA requires federal agencies, in consultation
with the Secretary of Commerce, to ensure that
any action authorized, funded, or carried out by
the agency is not likely to jeopardize endangered
or threatened species or their habitats.
Defenders claimed that the Coast Guard’s fail-
ure to consult with NMFS with regard to the TSSs
in New England and along the southeastern coast
violates its duties under the ESA. The Coast Guard
argued that § 7 consultation had not been triggered
by the designation of the traffic separation schemes
in right whale habitat. Its argument was rather
ingenious. The Coast Guard claimed that it was
simply following the orders of the International
Maritime Organization (IMO). Amazingly, the dis-
trict court bought it and dismissed the Defenders’
claim for lack of jurisdiction. The district court
concluded that because the U.S. must submit its
recommendations for TSSs to the IMO for adop-
tion on the international level, it was the IMO, not
the Coast Guard, who designated the schemes at
issue. As such, the Coast Guard had not engaged in
any final agency action which could trigger its
responsibilities under the ESA.
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit soundly rejected
this argument and held “by giving the Coast
Guard authority to promulgate traffic separation
schemes, Congress intended to make the Coast
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United States v. Park, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS
17075 (9th Cir. Aug. 11, 2008).
Arthur Park, 2L, University of Mississippi School of
Law
Does operating a dog kennel constitute “live-
stock farming”? Are dogs “livestock”? These
unique questions were recently explored by the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
Background
In 1973, Earl and Iona Monroe, the previous
owners of Tract 160A along Idaho’s Clearwater
River, granted the U.S. government a scenic
easement pursuant to the Wild and Scenic
Rivers Act.1 The purpose of the easement was to
permit the U.S. Forest Service to “protect the
scenic, recreational, geologic, fish and wildlife,
historic, cultural” and other values of the area
while preventing development that would
detract from those values.2
The language of the easement provides that
the “lands within the easement area shall not be
used for any professional or commercial activi-
ties except such as can be and are, in fact, con-
ducted from a residential dwelling without out-
side alteration of the dwelling.”2 The terms of the
easement do protect the “right to use the ease-
ment for general crop and livestock farming.”4
Ron and Mary Park purchased Tract 160A in
1989. Subsequently, the Parks received permis-
sion from the U.S. Forest Service to add horse
stalls (in 1989), use part of their home as a craft
and hobby shop (in 1990), and run a bed and
breakfast out of their home (in 1991). In 1997,
the Parks began advertising a kennel and dog
training business. In 1998, the Forest Service
notified the Parks that the kennel was an unau-
thorized commercial activity that violated the
terms of the easement and that the new struc-
tures had been built without Forest Service
approval. The parties exchanged letters, with-
out coming to a resolution, in 1998 and again in
2003. In 2005, the U.S. filed suit.
On cross-motions for summary judgment,
the U.S. argued that the kennel was a commer-
cial activity (and thus prohibited) while the
Parks contended that the kennel was livestock
farming (and thus protected). The Idaho
District Court concluded that the terms of the
easement were unambiguous and that no matter
“how broadly one defines livestock farming, the
Parks’ activities do not fall within its terms.”5
The district court granted the government’s
motion for summary judgment and ordered the
Parks to end the kennel business and remove
any structures related to the kennel or convert
such structures to non-commercial use.
Defining “Livestock”
Under Idaho law, a property conveyance whose
language is unambiguous must be interpreted
by its plain language, using only what is con-
tained within the four corners of the document.
Ambiguity exists only if the language is “subject
to conflicting interpretations.”6
The easement for Tract 160A does not define
the terms “livestock” or “livestock farming.”
The Court looked to the dictionary definitions
of “livestock,” such as “animals kept or raised
for use or pleasure; esp: farm animals kept for
use and profit,”7 “animals, esp. on a farm,
regarded as an asset,”8 and “domestic animals
and fowls that (1) are kept for profit or pleasure,
(2) can normally be confined within boundaries
without seriously impairing their utility, and (3)
do not normally intrude on others’ land in such
a way as to harm the land or growing crops.”9
Similarly, a recent California case analyzed the
dictionary definitions of “livestock” and con-
cluded that “the scope of domestic animals used
or raised on a farm can potentially extend to
guinea pigs, cats, dogs, fish, ants, and bees.”10
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Ninth Circuit Examines Whether
Dogs Are Livestock
The U.S. argued that “livestock” should be
defined as “cattle, horses, mules, or asses” as
found in an Idaho statute.11 This statutory pro-
vision, however, dealt only with the branding of
animals. Other Idaho statutes define “livestock”
to include cassowary, ostrich, emu, and rhea12 as
well as fallow deer, elk, and reindeer.13
Relying on Mountainview Landowners
Cooperative Association, Inc. v. Cool,14 a dispute
over the language of a property easement that
protected “swimming and boating,” the Ninth
Circuit found a latent ambiguity in the Parks’
easement. A “latent ambiguity is not evident on
the face of the instrument alone, but becomes
apparent when applying the instrument to the
facts as they exist.”15 In Mountainview, the ease-
ment did not define swimming nor was there a
uniform definition of swimming in the dictio-
naries. Furthermore, a strict definition of swim-
ming (to propel oneself through water) would
have led to illogical results.16 Thus, the Idaho
Supreme Court found a “latent ambiguity” with
regard to swimming. 
The Ninth Circuit was not persuaded by the
government’s definition of “livestock” as “cat-
tle, horses, mules, or asses.” The easement did
not incorporate the definitions of the Idaho
Code, so there was no compelling reason to dis-
regard the plain dictionary meaning. And even
if the easement did incorporate the definitions
of the Idaho Code, there is more than one defi-
nition of “livestock” found therein.
Conclusion
The Ninth Circuit reversed the order of the
Idaho District Court and remanded the case for
further proceedings at the trial level. Since
there is no uniform definition of “livestock” or
any guidance within the four corners of the doc-
ument, the Ninth Circuit held that the term
“livestock” is ambiguous. The District Court’s
granting of summary judgment, based on an
unambiguous definition of “livestock,” was
therefore premature. It is important to note that
the Ninth Circuit did not decide the question of
whether the term “livestock” does encompass
dogs. The Court merely held that the term “live-
stock” could encompass dogs. The Idaho
District Court is now charged with answering
that question.
Endnotes
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Humane Society of the United States v. Gutierrez,
523 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008).
Alicia Schaffner, 3L, Roger Williams University
School of Law
Stephanie Showalter, J.D., M.S.E.L.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently
granted the Humane Society’s request for an
emergency stay to stop the National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS) and the states of
Washington, Oregon and Idaho from killing a
group of California sea lions in an effort to pre-
vent their predation of salmon. While the emer-
gency order saved the lives of these sea lions, it
does not prohibit all government action, as
NMFS and the states may still capture and relo-
cate the sea lions.  
Background
The California sea lion, as a marine mammal, is
protected under the Marine Mammal Pro-
tection Act (MMPA). With the U.S. stock esti-
mated at 244,000, however, NOAA Fisheries
considers the California sea lion to be at its opti-
mum sustainable population.1 As the most com-
mon pinniped species in California, conflicts
naturally arise along the West Coast between
the sea lions who eat fish, fishermen who catch
the fish, and the government agencies who man-
age all of the above. 
In recent years, sea lions have been congre-
gating 145 miles up the Columbia River where
the Bonneville Dam creates an artificial bottle-
neck for migrating salmon. NMFS estimated
that, if left unchecked, sea lions could consume
between 212 and 2,094 spring Chinook salmon
at Bonneville Dam or .3 to 4.4 percent of the
population.2 Commercial salmon fishermen and
some of their supporters claim that sea lions are
pushing the fish to extinction. While predation
certainly has an impact, salmon populations are
primarily threatened by habitat modification
and overfishing. The difficult question facing
NMFS is what species has priority – the sea
lions protected by the MMPA or the salmon and
steelhead protected by the Endangered Species
Act (ESA)? 
Congress has tilted the balance towards the
salmon. The MMPA permits NMFS to “autho-
rize the intentional lethal taking of individually
identifiable pinnipeds which are having a signif-
icant negative impact on the decline or recovery
of salmonid fishery stocks” listed as threatened
or endangered under the ESA.3 After non-lethal
measures, such as acoustic harassment and aver-
sive conditioning, failed to deter sea lions from
Bonneville Dam earlier this year, the states
sought permission to kill the offending animals.
NMFS stirred up a storm when it granted
approval, valid until June 20, 2012, for the tak-
ing of up to “85 California sea lions annually.”4
The Humane Society filed suit to prevent the
states from killing the sea lions. The district
court denied the Humane Society’s request for a
preliminary injunction concluding that while
the plaintiffs had a “slight edge on the merits of
the case,” the balance of harm tipped in favor of
NMFS and the states.5 The Humane Society sub-
sequently petitioned the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals for an emergency order to stay the exe-
cution of NMFS’ approval pending appeal.
Emergency Stay
Courts consider four factors when deciding
whether to issue a stay pending appeal: “(1)
whether the stay applicant has made a strong
showing that he is likely to succeed on the mer-
its; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably
injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of
the stay will substantially injure the other par-
ties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where
the public interest lies.”6 The Ninth Circuit
focused on three facts. First, the lethal taking of
Ninth Circuit Grants Partial
Reprieve to California Sea Lions
the California sea lions, as well as the consump-
tion of salmon by the sea lions, is irreparable.
There is no means of repairing that damage.
Second, the granting of a stay should only affect
the 2008 salmon run at Bonneville Dam,
because the merits of the case should be
resolved before next year’s run. Finally, the 2008
salmon run was estimated to be very large com-
pared to previous years.
Given these facts, the Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that the balance of harm tipped in favor
of the Humane Society. NMFS had argued that
the consumption of as many as 2,094 salmon by
the sea lions would cause irreparable harm. The
Ninth Circuit did not agree, primarily because
the total salmon run was estimated to be
269,000 fish and the sea lions would eat, at most,
4.4 percent of the run. Since the district court
had found that the Humane Society was likely
to succeed on the merits, the plaintiffs met their
burden for a stay pending appeal.
The Ninth Circuit stayed the state’s autho-
rized action to manage predation at the
Bonneville Dam only “to the extent their pro-
posed actions involve the lethal taking of any
sea lions.”7 NOAA Fisheries’ approval, however,
also authorized the states to relocate up to nine-
teen California sea lions to zoos and aquari-
ums.8 The Ninth Circuit allowed that portion of
the approval to stand. 
Temporary Reprieve?
The battle lines are clearly drawn and there are
casualties on both sides. In late April, biologists
began trapping sea lions. One sea lion died dur-
ing the health exam, but the other six were suc-
cessfully transported to Sea World. Things went
downhill after that. On May 4, two Steller sea
lions and four California sea lions were found
dead in a trap near the dam. The cause of the
deaths is unclear, although heat and stress are
the two most likely culprits. Trapping has been
suspended until March 1, 2009.9
During the 2008 Columbia River salmon
run, spring Chinook salmon returned in lower
numbers than expected10 and the Army Corps of
Engineers watched nearly 100 sea lions feast on
4,230 salmon and steelhead.11 After a hearing on
the merits of the case on September 3, U.S.
District Court Judge Michael Mosman stated
that he is “inclined to side with the government
on the issue of whether it can kill up to 85 sea
lions a year at Bonneville Dam beginning next
spring to reduce salmon predation.”11 An appeal
of Judge Mosman’s ruling, whatever his deci-
sion, is almost a foregone conclusion.
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Foster v. Legal Sea Foods, Inc., and Great Eastern
Mussel Farms, Inc., 2008 U.S. Distr. LEXIS 57117
(July 25, 2008).
Timothy M. Mulvaney, J.D.
The United States District Court for the District
of Maryland dismissed a lawsuit filed by a cou-
ple seeking compensatory and punitive damages
as a result of their claim that they contracted the
Hepatitis A Virus (HAV) from eating raw or
undercooked mussels at a Baltimore restaurant.
Background
On February 7, 2002, the plaintiffs, Ryan and
wife Juliet Foster, dined at a restaurant incorpo-
rated as Legal Sea Foods, Inc. (Legal). The cou-
ple ordered steamed mussels, but after eating
several of the mussels, realized that some were
still closed. Mussels have a ligament that joins
the two shells together, and this ligament con-
tracts when properly heated, causing the shells
to open. The Fosters advised the Legal waitress,
who took the mussels away and later returned
with what appeared to be the same batch, but
cooked and, thus, opened.1
On March 12, 2002, Ryan developed severe
flu-like symptoms and an emergency room
physician ultimately diagnosed him with acute
HAV.2 HAV is a temporary but often violent dis-
ease of the liver contracted by eating food or
drinking water that is contaminated by human
waste, with an incubation period of approximate-
ly two to seven weeks. The physician referred
Ryan to a Dr. Joseph Galati for consultation. On
April 4, 2002, Juliet developed similar symptoms
and an emergency room physician diagnosed her
with the milder second-degree HAV.3
The Fosters initiated this litigation by filing
claims of negligence, strict liability and breach
of warranty against Great Eastern Mussel Farms,
Inc. (GEMF) and Legal. Plaintiffs alleged that
GEMF sold Legal mussels that contained HAV
due to their harvesting in polluted waters.4
Further, plaintiffs alleged that Legal negligently
failed to take proper safety precautions prior to
serving these mussels.5
Plaintiffs offered an expert report by Dr.
Galati. After reviewing Ryan’s medical history
and analyzing his behavior, Dr. Galati concluded
that, “besides Legal’s mussels, ‘there [were] no
other obvious risk factors’” for acquiring HAV,
and the mussels therefore were more likely than
not the source of Ryan’s contraction.6
Plaintiffs also offered an expert report by a
Mr. Roy Costa, a sanitarian, who concluded that
HAV survived Legal’s “ineffective steaming” of
the mussels served to the Fosters.7 Defendant’s
expert, Dr. Robert Price, contradicted this asser-
tion, stating that the steaming process “may or
may not inactivate HAV.”8
Mr. Costa also asserted that GEMF utilized
seawater from a harbor that was most likely con-
taminated by “overboard dumping of sewage and
ensuing pollution,” and from areas that were
already closed to shellfishing due to pollution.9
GEMF denied ever using water from areas closed
to shellfishing, as evidenced by its harvesting
tags10, and its expert disputed Mr. Costa’s claim
that shellfish can be contaminated with HAV
from waters approved for shellfishing.11
Further, Mr. Costa cited to 1993-1997 nation-
al data of the Center for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), two published reports from
1984 and 2004, and his own 1990-2002 research
in an effort to support his claim that “there is a
well-established link” between shellfish and
HAV.12 Dr. Price’s report examined more recent
CDC data from 1990-2001, which explained that
“food was the source of the contamination in just
Federal Court Dismisses Lawsuit
Alleging Contraction of Hepatitis A
from Undercooked Mussels
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one percent of the 286,881 acute cases of HAV
reported to the CDC,” none of which were from
shellfish or mussels.13
The defendants filed a motion with the court
seeking to bar the testimony of plaintiffs’
experts, Dr. Galati and Mr. Costa. Specifically,
the defendants sought an order to exclude from
use at trial the following opinions due to their
unreliability: Dr. Galati’s conclusions that Ryan
likely contracted HAV from Legal’s mussels and
that Juliet likely contracted HAV from either
Ryan or Legal’s mussels, and Mr. Costa’s con-
clusions that the HAV was caused by GEMF’s
use of polluted seawater to cleanse and prepare
the mussels. The defendants further asked the
court to grant summary judgment in its favor if
it excluded this expert testimony, alleging that
plaintiffs would be left without evidence that
their consumption of the mussels caused the
HAV diagnoses. For purposes of this motion, the
defendants conceded that Legal served under-
cooked mussels to the plaintiffs and that the
plaintiffs subsequently contracted HAV. The
plaintiffs opposed the motion, positing that they
intended to offer their experts’ testimonies to
educate the jury on a variety of issues, including
Legal’s and GEMF’s food handling practices
and whether the undercooked mussels were the
source of the HAV contracted by the Fosters.
Expert Reports Found Inadmissible
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides that
expert reports and expert testimony are admis-
sible if they will assist the trier of fact in
understanding the evidence, are based upon
sufficient facts or data, are the product of reli-
able methodologies, and the report or witness
presents a reliable application of those
methodologies to the facts of the case.14 The
United States Supreme Court has outlined
two principles for trial courts to bear in mind
when deciding whether to admit expert
reports: (1) liberal introduction of relevant
reports, with a focus on cross-examination
and the presentation of contrary evidence to
counterbalance the veracity and reliability of
an admitted opinion, and (2) the high poten-
tial for expert opinions to mislead juries.15 The
Court listed four factors to guide reliability
determinations: (1) the use of a tested theory, as
opposed to a subjective opinion; (2) whether
the theory has been subject to peer review; (3)
whether there is a known rate of error; and (4)
whether the conclusion is accepted within the
given scientific community.16
District Court Judge Catherine Blake deter-
mined that both Dr. Galati and Mr. Costa were
qualified experts in their respective fields.
However, Judge Blake held that the experts’ con-
clusions that the undercooked mussels caused
the Fosters’ HAV were not reliable because they
failed to rule out, or at least minimize, alterna-
tive causes, such as other foods, contact with
infected persons, and medications, as required
for a valid causation opinion. In the court’s view,
the temporal relationship between the Fosters’
dining at Legal and the onset of HAV symptoms
supported Dr. Galati’s conclusion, but because
of the long HAV incubation period, any number
of unaccounted for causes may have intervened. 
Similarly, the court found that Mr. Costa’s
methodology failed to establish causation,
defining his “traceback” from the Fosters’ ill-
ness to the mussels as “disjointed and specula-
tive” in light of the lack of evidentiary support
for his suspicions that GEMF withdrew the
mussels from polluted waters or that any mus-
sels in any area of GEMF’s facilities were cont-
aminated.17 In addition, Judge Blake placed sig-
nificant emphasis on what she termed “scant
Photograph of mussels courtesy of NOAA’s Ocean Explorer.
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epidemiological evidence regarding the preva-
lence of HAV in mussels, or even shellfish gen-
erally,” referring to Mr. Costa’s sources as “large-
ly outdated” and not sufficient to “persuasively
establish mussels as a frequent source of HAV.”18
Summary Judgment for Legal and GEMF
Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence
is such that, at trial, no reasonable jury could
return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party.
In granting the defendants’ motion, and thus,
closing the matter, the court held that, without
Dr. Galati’s and Mr. Costa’s causation testimony,
the Fosters failed to make a sufficient showing to
establish an essential element to their claims.
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Guard accountable for them.”8 The IMO is a spe-
cialized agency of the United Nations tasked with
developing and maintaining a comprehensive reg-
ulatory framework for shipping, which it does by
facilitating the negotiation and adoption of
treaties. Given the international nature of com-
mercial shipping, the court (or legislators) have
determined it is reasonable to ask countries to sub-
mit their recommendations for shipping routes to
the IMO for adoption on the international level.
The approval of those recommendations, however,
does not provide the IMO with any authority to
promulgate regulations in the U.S. Only the Coast
Guard has the authority to promulgate regulations
governing shipping routes.
The D.C. Circuit found there was ample evi-
dence of final agency action with respect to TSSs.
Over the years, the Coast Guard has conducted
and published the results of port access route
studies, accepted public comments on proposed
routes, and ensured that final TSSs appear in the
Code of Federal Regulations following adoption
by the IMO. The promulgation of a TSS is a final
agency action triggering consultation with NMFS
under the ESA.
Conclusion
The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant
of summary judgment with regard to the denial of
Defenders’ emergency rulemaking petition.
However, because the D.C. Circuit found that the
Coast Guard’s designation of traffic separation
schemes triggers §7 consultation, the court reversed
the district court’s grant of summary judgment and
remanded the case for further proceedings.
Endnotes
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Two high school seniors in New York City caused a stir this summer when the results of their sci-
ence project revealed that one-fourth of the sushi they purchased was mislabeled. The students
purchased samples of sushi from four restaurants and ten grocery stores
in Manhattan and shipped the samples to the University of Guelph in
Ontario, where a graduate student had agreed to do the genetic
analysis. Comparing the samples with DNA information
stored in the Fish Barcode of Life (http://www.fishbol.org/),
the graduate student determined that two restaurants and six
grocery stores had sold mislabeled fish. For example, seven of
nine samples sold as red snapper were mislabeled. One sample
was actually Atlantic cod. (New York Times, Aug. 21, 2008).
The Australia High Court, the country’s highest judicial body,
recently issued a landmark ruling granting traditional owners, i.e. the Aborigines, the right to
exclude people from using the foreshore (the area between low and high tide) without permission.
The ruling only directly affects fishermen on beaches and tidal rivers in Australia’s Northern
Territory, the area at issue in the case, but could provide precedent for Aboriginal claims in other
parts of the country. A spokesman for the traditional owners indicated that they would seek to
develop a permit system for uses in the area.
(Associated Press, July 30, 2008).
Google recently filed a patent for a “wave-based
data center” and a “crane-removable module,” a
container-based data center. As if the regulatory
regime for offshore alternative energy is not confus-
ing enough, it appears companies are now trying to
figure out how to move their data centers offshore
and power them by wave energy. Note to the
Mineral Management Service: Brush up on your
intellectual property law. (environmentalleader.com,
Sept. 9, 2008).
In another interesting legal development from Australia, the New South Wales Court of Appeals
overturned a decision of the Land and Environment Court last November that would have legally
bound planning departments to consider the risk of climate change-induced flooding when
approving coastal developments. The Court of Appeals declined to void the Planning Minister’s
decision even though there was no evidence that he considered the increased risk of flooding due
to climate change. The plaintiffs had argued that the departments could not determine whether
the developments met the principles of ecologically sustainable development without considering
this increased risk. (The Canberra Times, Sept. 25, 2008).
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